Thoughts on what social science can and cannot do
- Jo B. Helgetun

- Jan 17, 2020
- 3 min read
Updated: Jan 27, 2020
One may begin thinking on what science can and cannot do by revisiting and paraphrasing Max Weber’s (2003 [1958]) proposition that the social sciences should be value free and focused on what is and separating episteme (justified assertion) from doxa (unjustified opinion), leaving what ought to be and judgement of what is to philosophy and theology. That is not to say academia, or researchers, should avoid opinions on what ought to be, but that we must recognise the distinction between ethics and science, and not camouflage opinion as empirical evidence. I.e. Science can never determine what a goal of education ought to be, only how we should go about achieving a goal. Science may tell us how to educate, but not if we ought to educate tout court. To exemplify we may imagine this line of exchange between two individuals: "why educate teachers? To have good education. Why do you want good education? Because science shows it helps economic growth, and that growth is good. But science also shows economic growth as it is now is bad for the planet?" We should also ask what is good or bad. Both are value words, what is good in a moral sense for one may be bad for another. Thus, at some point any dialogue on what one ought to do will encounter a question of value, and of opposing values. Science may analyse value, it may analyse what values lead to what outcome for example, but it may not prescribe it. Particularly in the absence of any absolute notion of truth that may determine a natural purpose of all humanity for all time in all things (e.g. the Ten Commandments denote what ought to be done at all times and in all contexts, as the God given nature of good human behaviour). Science then deals with cause and effect and attempting to understand what is reality, not whether or not that reality is good or bad and should be changed to something a scientist desires. These notions are further discussed in chapter 1, and have implications both at a conceptual and empirical level. Hence, what we ought to do in education is a philosophical value question, i.e. ethics and purpose (e.g. why desire X). In contrast, science may say if outcome X is desired you should try to do A, B, and C while avoiding D and possibly E, that is the purpose of science (determining how). Thus, one should be clear as to what is, or can be, evidence, and what is opinion inherently rooted in a (moral) value. Hence, science may say capitalism is bad if we want a more equal society (Marx & Engels 1998), or if we want a more sustainable (Piketty 2014) or happy society should evidence indicate it is so, but it may not say capitalism is bad full stop without claiming an absolute authority over the human nature and purpose of existence. This also means that life and social domains such as education or economics cannot only be data and evidence driven, nor run by science in all things. The humane element of knowledge, that relates to values of what ought to be done must be present.
Unfortunately this seems somewhat neglected in the modern evidence-based society. Today "evidence" is called for to underpin anything from decisions on how to eat to how to structure sleep. Not to mention the range of evidence used to justify policy and ideology based politics across a range of sectors. In education for example, a 2012 House of Commons report mentioned "Singapore" 79 times as an education model to emulate due to their performance in the PISA tests. Meanwhile, interviews I have conducted indicate that what is touted as systematic reviews, in reality boils down to pre-determined outcomes and an impression that if fact finders write what they think, their reports will never be published.
Hence, what we appear to be witnessing is "evidence" and the power of science as a form of rationalized myth. Where policy is to be science driven, and society structured by data. A society where we believe science can denote purpose and how things ought to be done, as opposed to an indicator of what should be done to achieve something we have determined is desirable through philosophy, morals, ethics and a democratic process.
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